Saturday, November 30, 2019

Musings from the Madhouse Friday, April 25, 2003: Medical Miracle or Diagnostic Duplicity?

(This is the only guest blog article I’ve ever published here. I have not edited a single comma. C. Rodney Yoder wrote this over 16 years ago. He was released from custody only a year or two after he wrote the article, and he has been a fine and law-abiding citizen ever since. He pays his taxes, manages his several real estate properties, fixes things for people, and cares for his animals. Despite all the public resources spent over many years to call him “mentally ill” and to (unsuccessfully) force psychiatric “treatment” on him, he remains alive and well, usually in good humor, triumphant in the end, over the “psychoquacks” and slavers of the Illinois plantations.)
_________________________________

      For nearly 12 years I languished at the Chester Mental Health Center. My captors asserted in sworn petitions for my involuntary commitment that I was “sick” with diseases dubbed “bipolar disorder, manic type, by history” and “paranoid personality disorder.” My captors further swore that the symptoms of these purportedly real diseases were my complaining about their deprivation of my liberty and attendant violations of my supposed rights as a so-called “mental patient.” No other “symptoms” were ever offered.
    After about three years of having this alleged diagnosis inflicted on me, my captors then gave me a new diagnosis of “delusional disorder, persecutory type.” Their  rationale was something like “His complaints against us should never be considered anything other than the gibberings of a lunatic and nobody should ever investigate what he is relating or intervene on such a fool’s errand. His complaints are symptoms of a disease and not a reflection of reality or any actual misconduct by the CMHC and its employees.” At the same time the ascription of “bipolar disorder” mysteriously vanished from my captors collection of fairy tales called a clinical chart.
    At my trial in December handsomely paid so-called experts swore that I am afflicted with “delusional disorder” and that there was absolutely no question of this in their minds. When my lawyer cross-examined them he inquired about the diagnosis of “bipolar disorder” that was attributed to me by not just one or two potentially “mistaken” CMHC “clinicians” but by no less than over a dozen psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. They all feigned ignorance and we had to dig through copies of their so-called “treatment” plans from 1991 through 1995 and show the signed diagnoses of all these supposed clinicians. No satisfactory explanation was ever given for this switch in diagnosis or abandonment of the first one.
    Psychiatry claims that mental illness is a real and unmistakable disease akin to cancer or diabetes. Bipolar disorder and the psychoses, like delusional disorder, are further asserted to be actual diseases of a person’s brain. The so-called experts testifying at my trial were paid over $100,000 of Illinois tax dollars. Bipolar disorder, delusional disorder, schizophrenia and so on are alleged to be definable and different from each other.
    Upon admission to the Elgin madhouse in April, a new psychiatrist, Syed Hussain, announced to me that I have bipolar disorder. I thanked him warmly for this confirmation of the utter quackery of psychiatry.
    In the time it took for my Chester madhouse captors to drive me to another madhouse, I was miraculously cured of one real brain disease and came down with a different one. It’s a miracle. Or else it’s complete fraud.
    Psychiatric diagnoses have nothing whatsoever to do with a person’s brain or body, neurotransmitters, chemical imbalances, vitamin deficiencies, or any other somatic component. If they did, psychoquacks would at least pretend to examine their victims’ bodies, brains, fluids, and so forth. Never, in 12 years of psychiatric incarceration during which my captors said they repeatedly “evaluated” me for mental illness, did anyone actually examine my brain or nervous system or even suggest doing so. The only person to ever do so was Nelson Borelli, MD of Northwestern University and his examination is recorded here on RodneyYoder.net. Dr. Borelli performed a standard neurological test and is 99% certain I have no diseases of my brain. He also performed a standard mental status examination and found no problems in my memory or functioning. This is something my government captors have never done. The examination is posted for the entire world to see, including my lying captors.
    Although I continue to be deprived of my liberty, my new prison is at least infinitely more humane than my last. At Elgin madhouse I have not been subjected to any violence, guard engineered attacks, threats, or degradations. At Chester madhouse, I was daily demonized, ridiculed, threatened with violence, and dehumanized. I was regularly attacked by felons acting at the guards’ direction or with their permission. The guards told everyone that I was an outcast and they would never let me leave that facility. The Chester Mental Health Center is a renegade facility and the legislature of this state should immediately close its doors and disband the network of thugs running it before more lives are destroyed.
    The diagnoses of psychiatry are never a description of a person but, rather, they are a disposition of the person. These labels declare that a person should be dealt with as garbage or as a child and be controlled, locked up, removed from the community, drugged, excluded, segregated and disenfranchised.  Psychiatry lies when it claims to be involved in “helping” others. Psychiatry is a tool of social and political control and human garbage disposal.
    For 12 years my rednecked torturers in Randolph County used psychoquackery to strip me of my precious freedom. When Governor Blagojovich intervened and ordered my removal from Chester madhouse, my captors tried to save face and deny this intervention by claiming they initiated it themselves in response to my supposed recovery from mental illness. Days later, the Randolph County State’s Attorney cooked up some bogus criminal charges against me. All the guards at the Chester madhouse boasted for years that if I were successful in procuring removal from their psychoprison, they’d persecute me with criminal prosecutions. They had to invent a crime to do so as self-defense is not a crime in Illinois and I will prove clearly that the alleged crime charged against me was an act of self-defense against actual criminals. Psychiatry was used to rip off 12 years of my liberty and when the fraud of it has now been fully exposed, my persecutors have resorted to the old standby of malicious criminal prosecution. It is time to bring these criminal psychoquacks to account in a court of law.

Monday, November 25, 2019

Federal Complaint in Case No. 19-cv-5078, Denzil Lawrence v. James P. Corcoran


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
_________________________________________
DENZIL LAWRENCE,                          )       Case No. 19-cv-5078 
                                                                )
                    Plaintiff,                              )       Hon. Mary M. Rowland, 
                                                                )       presiding
             v.                                                ) 
                                                               )
JAMES P. CORCORAN, individually, )       JURY DEMAND 
as Statewide Forensic Medical              ) 
Director for the Illinois                         ) 
Department of Human Services,           ) 
Medical Administrator III,                    )
                                                              )
                   Defendant.                         ) 
________________________________________

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

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NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Denzil Lawrence, by and through his attorneys, the Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, P.C., with his complaint against the above-named Defendant and requests trial by jury, and in support of his Complaint states as follows.
II.   JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201.
2. This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, as the judicial district in which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.
III.   PARTIES
3. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Denzil Lawrence was a resident of the State of Illinois and a legal resident of the United States of America.
4. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant James Patrick Corcoran (“Defendant” or “Corcoran”) was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Illinois Department of Human Services.  Corcoran is sued individually for actions and omissions taken under color law while working in his official capacity as a senior administrator of Elgin Mental Health Center and/or consultant in the Illinois Department of Human Services.

IV.  BACKGROUND FACTUAL SUMMARY AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS BASED UPON INFORMATION AND REASONABLE BELIEF

5. Plaintiff was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in the Circuit Court of Will County, on charges of arson and criminal damage to property in February, 2018.  He was had been committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) for inpatient mental health treatment, initially at Chester Mental Health Center (“CMHC”) as unfit to stand trial on September 26, 2017, and subsequently beginning August 18, 2018, he was held at Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC).  His Thiem date (the date beyond which his involuntary NGRI commitment could not be constitutionally continued) was March 20, 2019.
6. While he was committed at CMHC, Plaintiff took psychotropic medications but experienced unacceptable weight gain as a side effect.  Ultimately, after researching risks and benefits of medications, and after substantial remission of his earlier psychotic symptoms, he made an informed choice to try to recover more fully from mental illness without drugs.  He never ruled out medical treatment, including with psychotropic drugs, in the event that he again became symptomatic.  His psychiatrist at CMHC did not subsequently insist on Plaintiff being prescribed any particular prescription medication.
7. When he was transferred to EMHC in August 2018, he was assigned to the psychiatrist Dr. Richard Malis.  Dr. Malis initially suggested (and the Plaintiff tentatively agreed) to take quetiapine, an anti-psychotic drug, after giving him a “likely” diagnosis “in the spectrum between delusional disorder and schizophrenia.”
8. By early September 2018, the Plaintiff has lost confidence in Dr. Malis and elected not to take psychotropic medications.  He began to carefully document his disagreements with EMHC staff, made various attempts to obtain relevant records, and filed many specific written complaints with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
9. Despite a handful of minor “incidents” involving disagreements with peers or staff on the clinical units at EMHC, none of which involved any physical altercations or violence, monthly Treatment Plan Reports consistently stated between August 2018 and March 2019, that the Plaintiff was making some progress, cooperating with unit rules, and attending recommended therapy groups.
10. During his entire time at EMHC, the Plaintiff was never considered to be in need of emergency involuntary medication, restraint or seclusion, either for his own or anyone else’s protection.
11. Throughout his time at EMHC, up until mid-March of 2019, clinicians on the Plaintiff’s treatment teams were collaborating with him to develop relapse prevention and aftercare plans wherein he would be residing safely in the community with his parents in Florida and receiving any needed outpatient psychiatric and substance abuse treatment through a local Veterans’ Administration facility.  The expectation that he would be leaving EMHC on his Thiem date was entirely implicit and apparently unquestioned.
12. On or about March 13, 2019, exactly one week before the Plaintiff had to be released, unknown to the Plaintiff a decision was purportedly made by the Plaintiff’s treatment team psychiatrist, Dr. Vikramjit Gill, M.D., to file an involuntary civil commitment petition in Kane County Circuit Court (“Petition”), alleging (in summary) that the Plaintiff was mentally ill and thereby dangerous to himself or others, meeting the definition in Section 1-119 of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/1-119, of a “person subject to involuntary admission on an inpatient basis.”
13. Subsequently on March 20, 2019, without the knowledge of the Plaintiff, some hours after the Plaintiff should legally have been released, the threatened Petition was in fact filed, and the Plaintiff was held at EMHC, rather than released. 
14. Plaintiff’s father had actually traveled to Elgin from Florida to pick him up and take him home, fully expecting that his son would be released on his Thiem date of March 20, 2019, according to the long-established plan.
15. The Petition itself, alleging that the Plaintiff was a “person subject to involuntary admission on an inpatient basis” was signed by Melissa Perkins, the Plaintiff’s clinical social worker on N Unit at that time. 
16. The petition was accompanied by two certificates, one of Dr. Vikramjit Gill, M.D., and one of the Defendant James P. Corcoran, intended to certify pursuant to Section 3-702 of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code [405 ILCS 5/3-702] that the Plaintiff was subject to involuntary admission on an inpatient basis and containing other information.
17. On information and belief, Defendant James P. Corcoran was the actual instigator of the false involuntary civil commitment petition against the Plaintiff.  Corcoran exerted undue influence upon social worker Perkins and psychiatrist Dr. Gill, to file and certify the petition at the last possible minute.  As a Medical Administrator III and Statewide Forensic Medical Director, he was their boss, and he was in a powerful position to negatively impact or even end their careers as state mental health professionals.  But for Corcoran’s undue influence over Gill and Perkins, the civil commitment petition against the Plaintiff would not have been filed, and he would have been released on March 20, 2019. As a direct result of the false Petition, the Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned for a period lasting from March 20, 2019 for a period of ninety days, lasting until his release from  EMHC after the falsely filed Petition was dismissed on June 20, 2019 in the state court.
18. On information and belief, Dr. Corcoran is well known to be unreasonably prejudiced against forensic mental patients who decide to exercise their rights to refuse psychotropic medication, even when such decisions are based on legal and competent free choice, fully informed of risks and benefits.  He has expressed opinions and directly advised patients that if they do not comply with the recommendations of orthodox American psychiatrists employed by the State of Illinois (including taking of prescribed psychotropic medication), or do not convincingly profess strong belief in the diagnoses given to them by orthodox American psychiatrists employed by the State of Illinois, they should not and will not, if he has anything to say about it, be released from involuntary commitment.
19. On information and belief, one psychiatrist at EMHC who is most loyal and supportive of Defendant Corcoran’s points of view is Dr. Richard Malis, the Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist who prescribed psychotropic medications.
20. The Plaintiff, a well-educated East African immigrant who served honorably in the United States military in a combat role in Afghanistan, not only successfully refused to take psychiatric drugs, but also committed the affront of refusing to accept Dr. Richard Malis as his psychiatrist, and subsequently Plaintiff was able to fully recover drug-free and obtain the substantial collaboration of his clinical treatment team toward his release from EMHC.
21. On information and belief, Defendant Corcoran has directly, indirectly or impliedly threatened both Dr. Vikramjit Gill and social worker Melissa Perkins in the past, suggesting that they could suffer unfavorable employment consequences should they fail to effectively coerce their patients to take psychiatric drugs and profess full belief in their orthodox diagnoses.
22. In short, anyone, patient or employee, who does not toe Defendant Corcoran’s line in the forensic mental health system of the Illinois Department of Human Services, or who gives any impression that they do not adequately respect his status or his orthodox mental health culture, is threatened with negative consequences.  The Plaintiff suffered retribution born of Defendant Corcoran’s unlawful coercion in violation of the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff when Defendant Corcoran used fear of retribution perpetrated against both patients and staff who do not comply with his illegal orders.  Vikramjit Gill and Melissa Perkins were credibly threatened with similar retribution and acted from self protection. 
V.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
False imprisonment, denial of due process of law, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States

23. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 5-22, as if set forth here in their entirety.
24. Plaintiff was in custody and under the control of Defendant during and at all times described in this Complaint.
25. At all times described in this Complaint, Plaintiff was an unarmed, defenseless male and disabled person, such that he was no match for the trained and sophisticated Defendant, who was an experienced mental health professional with custodial authority over the Plaintiff as an educated and licensed as a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry.
26. All of the described acts and/or omissions by the Defendant were intentional, knowing, willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless in disregard for the Plaintiff’s federally protected rights and welfare, and these acts were done with deliberate indifference by the Defendants, acting under color of state law.
27. With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from false imprisonment, Defendant ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to a dangerous environment of psychological brutality through the false imprisonment of the disabled, and other deprivations of essential, fundamental humanity under auspices of “mental health treatment”  by:
a.  Falsly alleging that Plaintiff was mentally ill, filing false court documents including coercion of other subordinate staff in filing a civil commitment petition to force Plaintiff  to continue to be imprisoned in the Elgin Mental Heath Center while also failing to subject himself or his staff sufficient training or supervision with respect to the constitutional limitations on the incarceration and false imprisonment of patients, especially the Plaintiff;

b. failing to adequately punish unconstitutional false imprisonment of patients, especially the Plaintiff;

c.  ordering and tolerating the false imprisonment of patients, especially the Plaintiff;

d. failing to properly or neutrally investigate whether his own actions and actions which he ordered others to take would create the false imprisonment of patients, especially the Plaintiff; and,

e.   ordering, tolerating, encouraging, and permitting collusive statements among the staff, investigators and the police to discourage proper investigation and cover up crimes and illegal abuse in such situations.

28. On information and belief, Defendant ordered and/or permitted staff members at the Facility, under a “mental health” pretense, to falsely imprison disabled individuals when such activities are unnecessary, unjustified and contrary to any conceivable standard as “treatment”.  Defendant also coerced staff or failed or refused to supervise and train staff in the appropriate constitutional implications and limits on false imprisonment, despite knowing that these staff are critical to the protection of the constitutional rights of the patients, and therefore may create a significant risk of injury to the public who are patients at Elgin Mental Health Center, especially the Plaintiff.
29. Under a pretense and with the cynical, false justification of “encouraging adherence” to treatment recommendations, the Defendant used tactics of coercion, false imprisonment and mental abuse to punish and threaten patients at the EMHC to establish a brutal and dehumanizing environment of control, instead of collaborating and rationally explaining benefits and risks of treatment in the spirit of their legal obligations under informed consent and legal and moral obligation to provide real help to the Plaintiff.
30. Under a pretense and with the cynical, false justification of “encouraging insight” into mental illness, the Defendant used false imprisonment to punish and threaten patients at the Facility, especially the Plaintiff, into robotic “lip service” and enforced, totalistic faith in the orthodoxy of mental-illness-as-brain-disease, instead of rationally explaining any actual, existing science in the field of aberrant human behavior, cognition and emotion to the patients, especially the Plaintiff.
31. The more Defendant Corcoran, habitually resorted to coercion and false imprisonment to obtain what he called “treatment adherence” and “insight” from patients, the more dependent he became on such tactics, and the more he lost any abilities he might have had, which courts and the public naturally expect him to employ, as a doctor and healer.
32. On information and belief, Defendant actively worked to find no fault with staff conduct, and to assure that no fault is found by any outside investigators, so long as any story at all is offered by staff in response to a patient complaint, regardless of how incredible such response is wherein the Defendant, willfully failed to prevent the ongoing false imprisonment of the Plaintiff.
33. Defendant routinely ratifies, acquiesces, rubber stamps, and tolerates malicious collusive conduct and unconstitutional actions of staff by routinely ignoring serious complaints of false imprisonment and other corrupt acts against patients, especially the Plaintiff, and by encouraging fabrication of evidence by the staff.
34. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of the Defendant, Plaintiff has been substantially injured.  These injuries include, but are not limited to, loss of constitutional and federal rights, loss of normal good family relations, loss of income, physical injuries, physical and mental impairments, great pain and emotional distress, and/or aggravation of pre-existing conditions, and ongoing special damages for medically/psychologically related treatment necessitated by the unconstitutional and brutal concerted conduct of the Defendant.
35. The Plaintiff now suffers from these injuries, with an inability to consistently live a normal life free from the trauma caused by the very staff charged with responsibility for his treatment or rehabilitation.
36. The Plaintiff also suffers persisting emotional damage the extent of which has not yet been fully ascertained.  Plaintiff continues to suffer ongoing emotional distress, with significant stress related symptoms.
37. Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages on all claims against the individual Defendants personally, to redress their willful, malicious, wanton, reckless and fraudulent conduct.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and grant:
A.  compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

B.  economic losses on all claims allowed by law;

C.  punitive damages on all claims allowed by law against the Defendant and in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

D.  attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, including expert witness fees, on all claims allowed by law;

E.  pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;

F.  Court-ordered equitable and injunctive relief from all contact or communication by the Defendant; and

G. Any further relief that this Court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate relief at law and equity.


PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.


            Respectfully submitted,

                           __/s/ S. Randolph Kretchmar
                           S. Randolph Kretchmar
                           One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiff

The Law Offices of Kretchmar & Cecala, P.C.
1170 Michigan Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091
847-370-5410
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Friday, November 8, 2019

Federal Complaint in Case No. 19-cv-7413, Jennifer Coleman v. Mark Roberson and Syed Hussain


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

                                                                        )
JENNIFER COLEMAN,                                )
                                                                        )
                                    Plaintiff,                      )
                                                                        )
            v.                                                         )            Case No.
                                                                        )
MARK ROBERSON, individually, and         )
SYED HUSSAIN, individually,                     )            JURY DEMAND
                                                                        )
                        Defendants.                             )


COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY



            NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Jennifer Coleman, by and through her attorneys, the Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, P.C., with her complaint against the above-named Defendants and requests trial by jury, and in support of her Complaint states as follows.
I.               INTRODUCTION
This is an action brought by Jennifer Coleman, a person previously confined in the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (“State”) at Elgin Mental Health Center (“Facility” or “Elgin”), to vindicate profound deprivations of her constitutional rights caused by institutionally based brutality.
II.   JURISDICTION AND VENUE
            1.            This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201.
            2.            This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, as the judicial district in which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.
III.   PARTIES
            3.            At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Jennifer Coleman was a resident of the State of Illinois and a legal resident of the United States of America.
4.            At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Mark Roberson (“Roberson”) was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Illinois Department of Human Services.  Roberson is sued individually for actions and omissions taken under color law while working as an employee of Elgin Mental Health Center and/or the Illinois Department of Human Services.
5.            At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Syed Hussain (“Hussain”) was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Illinois Department of Human Services.  Hussain is sued individually for actions and omissions taken under color law while working as an employee of Elgin Mental Health Center and/or the Illinois Department of Human Services.

IV.  BACKGROUND FACTUAL SUMMARY AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A DISABLED PERSON, DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

6.            Plaintiff was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in the Circuit Court of Kane County, for a criminal charge of Aggravated Battery in  2013.  She was committed to the custody of the State for inpatient mental health treatment at Elgin in May 15, 2013.
7.            Plaintiff was originally assigned to be housed and to receive treatment on clinical Unit H at Elgin.  She was subsequently transferred to the clinical Unit at William White Cottage in May, 2013.  The Defendant Mark Roberson was a Security Therapy Aid (STA) at White Cottage, and the Defendant Syed Hussain became the psychiatrist and treatment team leader on that clinical unit several years later.
8.            On January 10, 2019, Plaintiff was granted conditional release from Elgin to live at Bryn Mawr Care, a residential psychiatric rehabilitation facility in Chicago.  She remains there at the time of this filing.
9.            Throughout the six years of Plaintiff’s involuntary custody at Elgin, she was told, first by others and then most explicitly by Defendant Hussain, and/or she was implicitly led to believe, that her only hope of release lay in agreeing with and fully believing everything the staff said and thought about her, whether they specified formal psychiatric diagnoses in writing or prescribed drugs which might seem to have different benefits and risks than she was told to expect, whether they documented her behavior accurately or inaccurately, or even when they merely voiced informal and casual opinions about her personality.  Full faith in and agreement with staff, as the trained mental health professionals in charge of her treatment, and full submission to their slightest direction, was called “insight” into her mental illness.  In the absence of sufficient “insight” the Plaintiff could never be recommended by Elgin to the Court for release from custody at Elgin.
10.            On or about October 18, 2018, Defendant Roberson attempted to seduce the Plaintiff during a card game in a private booth on the clinical unit, first with conversation about what a “ladies’ man” he was, to imply that the Plaintiff would enjoy having a romantic or sexual relationship with him.  During card games that they played almost every night in November, 2018, Defendant Roberson showed Plaintiff his tattoos, and told her she had to hide her developing feelings for him, because other staff would notice if she “wore her feelings on her sleeve.”
11.            During October-December 2018, several staff frequently joked around or teased the Plaintiff and/or Defendant Roberson about how they spent so much time together, asking, e.g., “What’s going on with you two?”
12.            By December, 2018, Defendant Roberson was frequently coming to Plaintiff’s room on White cottage and engaging in explicitly sexual kissing and touching activity with her.  This occurred in full view of Plaintiff’s roommate, whom (along with the Plaintiff) Roberson threatened and sternly warned not to tell anyone.
13.            Plaintiff attempted to discourage the sexual relationship, telling Defendant Roberson to “forget it” as early as December 2, 2018.  However he was relentlessly seductive, calling her frequently from his cell at the patient phone on the unit, and he began to recite various “loving” intentions and promises, to help her improve her life situation when she would be released from Elgin.
14.            Plaintiff was expecting an upcoming court decision for her conditional release, and was unwilling to endanger a favorable ruling by angering a staff member or making what would become mere he-said-she-said accusations in the lopsided, “staff-is-always-right/mental-patient-is-always-wrong” venue of Elgin.
15.            Plaintiff was in no position and had no ability to give or withhold “consent” to any sexual activity or relationship with Defendant Roberson.  She was an involuntary psychiatric patient, a disabled person, relentlessly schooled by Defendant Hussain, the captain of her treatment team who dictated what her custodial program would be, that she must obey and defer to staff judgment in all matters concerning herself, including her own emotions and her own mind.  Hussain repeatedly told Plaintiff that her explanations of incidents or untrue staff reports were irrelevant, because she was a mental patient and only staff would be believed..
16.            Despite the Plaintiff’s reticence, Defendant Roberson continued his attempts during December 2018, and promised Plaintiff he would help her earn a degree when she got out of Elgin, he would find an apartment for her, and he would live with her and even marry her once he qualified for his retirement pension.  He discussed buying her an engagement ring, saying she would however have to keep it hidden.  These promises were combined with the implicit and omnipresent threat, always in the background: Defendant Roberson could easily insert reports into her psychiatric chart, which would have been entirely false but nevertheless believed, saying that she had been the one who tried to seduce him and characterizing her alleged behavior as symptomatic of such mental illness as should rule out her release.  Thus coerced, the sexual “relationship” continued.
17.            After Plaintiff was conditionally released on January 10, 2019, Defendant Roberson contacted her at Bryn Mawr Care by cell phone, as he had previously arranged with her to do.  On numerous occasions in January or early February he picked her up in his car and took her either (at first) to a hotel in Chicago or (later) to his apartment in Elgin.  Plaintiff wanted to have conversations and discuss the promises he had made and future plans with him, but Roberson repeatedly showed her that he was only interested in drinking and sex.  Plaintiff complied with his demands in part because he became very angry when he was drunk, and she was alternately afraid of him or felt sympathy for him.  On one occasion, Defendant had to call Plaintiff’s case worker Alex at Brynn Mawr Care to tell him she would be late coming back, and she had to have the hotel call a taxi for her to return to her residence because he was too drunk to drive, after he had already driven his car onto a snow bank.
18.            On or about February 8, 2019, Plaintiff finally managed to call off the relationship with Roberson.  She has not seen him again in person since then.
19.            On or about July 19, 2019, Defendant Roberson contacted the Plaintiff by phone and told her that someone had reported their earlier sexual and personal contacts to the Office of the Inspector General, and that he could be in trouble or even fired.  He clearly hoped that she would protect him from an expected or ongoing investigation.  He did not inform her that he was the only one in trouble (i.e., she was not), because under Illinois law, any sexual contact at all between institutional mental health staff and an involuntary patient constitutes a felony for which the staff can be prosecuted, and that no issue of the patient’s “consent” is even allowed. 
20.            During the phone conversation in July, 2019, Defendant Roberson told the Plaintiff to lie to police about their relationship.
V.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1.) Sexual abuse of a disabled person, false imprisonment/illegal seizure/deprivation of liberty, denial of due process of law: violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States

21.            Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 6-20, as if set forth here in their entirety.
22.            In 2013, Plaintiff was “hospitalized” as an involuntary psychiatric inpatient after a verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4.  She was evaluated as being in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis and placed in a secure setting at Elgin Mental Health Center.  Such involuntary “hospitalization” is legal only because its purposes do not include retribution, punishment, or deterrence.  An NGRI verdict is an acquittal of criminal culpability, and an acquittee may only be involuntarily hospitalized for treatment of an existing condition of mental illness.  Under the Constitution of the United States, she may not be hospitalized involuntarily in the absence of such condition, or in the absence of the possibility of “adequate and humane care and treatment” [405 ILCS 5/1-101.2] for such condition, regardless of previous criminal acts (however heinous), and regardless of any theoretical danger she may pose to herself or others.
23.            Even as a pretrial detainee is presumed innocent, and elaborate procedural rights are meant to guarantee her fair trial, a forensic psychiatric inpatient is not a criminal, and elaborate policy protections are meant to guarantee her treatment for the condition of mental illness.  In both circumstances, the point is to restrain human passion and flawed reaction in the name of reason and justice.  Our law demands criminal procedure for pretrial detainees, not lynchings; and it also demands medical treatment for NGRI acquittees, not psychiatric slavery.  Mental health treatment is inextricable from due process of law for the continuing confinement of any forensic psychiatric patient.  Abuse and neglect effectively sabotage mental health treatment.  Pursuant to 405 ILCS 5/2-112, “Every recipient of services in a mental health… facility shall be free from abuse and neglect.”  “Abuse” is defined under 405 ILCS 5/1-101.1 as “…any physical injury, sexual abuse, or mental injury inflicted on a recipient of services other than by accidental means.”
24.            Plaintiff was denied due process of law precisely because the Defendants abused her, and violated crucial policies, rules and criminal laws, thereby effectively eliminating all possibility of ameliorative treatment for her condition of mental illness and rendering her continued confinement, from the time of said violations, as a non-medical, abusive, and unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, false imprisonment and/or illegal seizure of plaintiff’s person.  Specifically:
            a. Defendant Roberson seduced or coerced the Plaintiff into a sexual             relationship while he was an employee of the state institution to which she was involuntarily committed, when she was legally incapable of consent and under his control.  This was a violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2(a)(2) and 720 ILCS 5/11-9.5, a Class 3 felony.
            b. Defendant Roberson threatened both the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s roommate with retribution, by saying any report they might make about his sexual abuse of the Plaintiff would only be said to be a symptom of their mental illness and justify longer involuntary hospitalization.  This was intimidation, a Class 3 felony under 720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(2), and an attempt and/or conspiracy to violate 59 Ill. Adm. Code §50.20.
            c. Defendant Hussain actively supported Defendant Roberson’s original and continuing opportunity to sexually abuse the Plaintiff, by carefully grooming and schooling the Plaintiff with the idea that mental health professionals are always right and are believed, whilst mental patients are always wrong and are not believed.  Defendant was denied all opportunity to be heard, and called a liar or troublemaker by Defendant Hussain on several occasions when she complained about staff behavior or any abuse of power.  Defendant Hussain made it clear that if Plaintiff wanted to be conditionally released, she should restrain herself from complaining             about staff.  This was intimidation, a Class 3 felony under 720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(2), and an attempt and/or conspiracy to violate 59 Ill. Adm. Code §50.20.

            25.            Relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
            Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .


            26.            Plaintiff at all times referred to in this action was and is a citizen of the United States and all of the individual Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
            27.            All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as employees of the State of Illinois, and their acts and/or omissions were conducted under the cover of their official duties or employment.
            28.            At all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily integrity and to be free from false imprisonment, illegal seizure of her person, and deprivation of liberty by employees of the State in the absence of due process of law and/or in violation of those policies and laws which specifically or impliedly justify and facilitate involuntary inpatient mental health treatment.
            29.            Any reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
            30.              The actions, deceptions and threats by Defendants Roberson and Hussain, as described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights.  The failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of illegal seizure, false imprisonment, intimidation and sexual misconduct which amounted to active subversion and sabotage by the Defendants, and each of them, of that due process of law (treatment) to which the Plaintiff was entitled, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Plaintiff.
            31.            Neither Defendant ever took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking sexual abuse by Defendant Roberson or the false imprisonment, deprivation of liberty, and intimidation, despite being in a position to do so.  The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking sexual abuse and other constitutional violations caused by the other Defendant.
            32.            Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected constitutional rights.
            33.            Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint with shocking and willful indifference to Plaintiff's rights, in full conscious awareness that they would cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
            34.            The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff, violated the contemporary standards of decency.  At no time was sexual abuse, deception or intimidation justified by any medical or mental health philosophy or the Plaintiff’s needs; but it was, entirely, misconduct and violation by the Defendants, and each of them, of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as outlined herein.
            35.            The Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of sexual abuse, deception and intimidation to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to submit to false imprisonment, unreasonable seizure of her person and deprivation of liberty which constituted an unlawful constitutional violation and a stripping away of her dignity and humanity.  The Plaintiff’s future freedom and wellbeing were completely controlled by the Defendants, whose actions violated contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant physical injury is evident.  The Defendants used sexual abuse, deception and intimidation in a willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion, as there was no need for sex at any time or under any circumstance during the Plaintiff’s confinement, nor was any deception or intimidation appropriate for a trained, responsible staff member in the mental health profession.
            36.            The Defendants’ sexual abuse, deception and intimidation exceeded any reasonable policy or practice.  The use of sexual abuse, and the deception and intimidation of the Plaintiff resulted in the false imprisonment, seizure of the Plaintiff’s person, and deprivation of liberty by confinement under an utterly false guise of mental health treatment, and it is sufficiently repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.
            37.            The acts or omissions of both Defendants were the direct and proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries.
            38.            The Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
            39.            The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
            40.            The Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
            41.            As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
            42.            On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the sexual abuse outlined herein.
            43.            Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
            44.            In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of Defendant have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff.
2.) Sexual abuse of a disabled person, battery, excessive force, denial of due process of law: violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
45.            Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this complaint, as if set forth here in their entirety.
            46.            Relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .


            47.            Plaintiff at all times referred to in this action was and is a citizen of the United States and the Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
            48.            The Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as employees of the State of Illinois, and their acts and/or omissions were conducted under the cover of their official duties or employment.
            49.            At all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual assault by the staff of the State and to due process of law before any force or battery might be used against her.
            50.            At all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily integrity and to be free from sexual abuse, intimidation and psychological manipulation, by the Defendants and other unknown employees of the State.
            51.            Any reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
            52.            The actions, deceptions, intimidation and effective enslavement as well as the use of force by Defendant Roberson, as described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights.  The failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of unlawful excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual misconduct as well as the active sabotage of such due process of law (mental treatment) to which Plaintiff was constitutionally entitled, by the Defendants, and each of them, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff.
            53.            The force used constituted excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse which could have caused and did cause serious injury to the Plaintiff.
            54.            Neither of the Defendants took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse by Defendant Roberson despite being in a position to do so. The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking force and other constitutional violations caused by each other Defendant.
            55.            Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected constitutional rights.
            56.            Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint with shocking and willful indifference to Plaintiff's rights, in full conscious awareness that they would cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
            57.            The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff, violated contemporary standards of decency.  At no time was such “treatment” justified by any medical or mental health philosophy, by the Plaintiff’s needs, or by policies and considerations of security, but was, entirely, misconduct by the Defendants, and each of them, in violation of Plaintiff’s Constituional Rights as outlined herein.
            58.            The Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to submit to excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse which constituted an unlawful bodily touching and stripping away her dignity and humanity by submitting to Defendant Roberson, who controlled the Plaintiff’s freedom and wellbeing.  Such actions violate contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant physical injury is evident.  The Defendants used force in a willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion, as there was no need for sex at any time or under any circumstance during the Plaintiff’s confinement, nor was any force, assault, battery, and/or sexual activity appropriate for a trained, responsible staff member in the mental health profession.
            59.            The Defendants’ excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse exceeded any reasonable use of force as no force was required whatsoever.  The use of force involving the sexual battery and enslavement of the Plaintiff constitutes sexual assault, battery, and excessive force under the guise of treatment. Such a use of force is so repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.
            60.            The acts or omissions of both Defendants were the direct and
proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries.
            61.            The Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
            62.            The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
            63.            The Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
            64.            As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
            65.            On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the sexual abuses outlined herein.
            66.            Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
            67.            In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each Defendant have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

            Plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against each of the Defendants and grant:
A.   compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

B.    economic losses on all claims allowed by law;

C.    punitive damages on all claims allowed by law against Defendants and in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

D.   attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, including expert witness fees, on all claims allowed by law;

E.    pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;

F.    Court-ordered equitable and injunctive relief from all contact or communication by the Defendants, including any further sexual advances, assaults or seductive communication from the Defendants; and

G.   Any further relief that this Court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate relief at law and equity.


PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.


                                                Respectfully submitted,

                                                __/s/ S. Randolph Kretchmar______________
                                                S. Randolph Kretchmar
                                                One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiff


The Law Offices of Kretchmar & Cecala, P.C.
1170 Michigan Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091
847-370-5410