IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF ILLINOIS
)
JENNIFER
COLEMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case
No.
)
MARK ROBERSON, individually, and )
SYED HUSSAIN, individually, ) JURY DEMAND
)
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY
NOW
COMES the Plaintiff, Jennifer Coleman, by and through her attorneys, the Law
Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, P.C., with her complaint against the
above-named Defendants and requests trial by jury, and in support of her
Complaint states as follows.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is an action brought by
Jennifer Coleman, a person previously confined in the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (“State”) at Elgin
Mental Health Center (“Facility” or “Elgin”), to vindicate profound
deprivations of her constitutional rights caused by institutionally based
brutality.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This
action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and it is brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and
2201.
2. This
case is instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, as the judicial district in
which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants
maintain offices and/or reside.
III. PARTIES
3. At
all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Jennifer Coleman was a resident of the
State of Illinois and a legal resident of the United States of America.
4. At
all times relevant hereto, Defendant Mark Roberson (“Roberson”) was a resident
of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting
under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Illinois
Department of Human Services.
Roberson is sued individually for actions and omissions taken under color
law while working as an employee of Elgin Mental Health Center and/or the
Illinois Department of Human Services.
5. At
all times relevant hereto, Defendant Syed Hussain (“Hussain”) was a resident of
the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under
color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Illinois
Department of Human Services.
Hussain is sued individually for actions and omissions taken under color
law while working as an employee of Elgin Mental Health Center and/or the
Illinois Department of Human Services.
IV.
BACKGROUND FACTUAL SUMMARY AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A DISABLED PERSON, DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS
6. Plaintiff
was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in the Circuit Court
of Kane County, for a criminal charge of Aggravated Battery in 2013. She was committed to the custody of the State for inpatient
mental health treatment at Elgin in May 15, 2013.
7. Plaintiff
was originally assigned to be housed and to receive treatment on clinical Unit
H at Elgin. She was subsequently
transferred to the clinical Unit at William White Cottage in May, 2013. The Defendant Mark Roberson was a
Security Therapy Aid (STA) at White Cottage, and the Defendant Syed Hussain
became the psychiatrist and treatment team leader on that clinical unit several
years later.
8. On
January 10, 2019, Plaintiff was granted conditional release from Elgin to live
at Bryn Mawr Care, a residential psychiatric rehabilitation facility in
Chicago. She remains there at the
time of this filing.
9. Throughout
the six years of Plaintiff’s involuntary custody at Elgin, she was told, first
by others and then most explicitly by Defendant Hussain, and/or she was implicitly
led to believe, that her only hope of release lay in agreeing with and fully
believing everything the staff said and thought about her, whether they
specified formal psychiatric diagnoses in writing or prescribed drugs which
might seem to have different benefits and risks than she was told to expect,
whether they documented her behavior accurately or inaccurately, or even when
they merely voiced informal and casual opinions about her personality. Full faith in and agreement with staff,
as the trained mental health professionals in charge of her treatment, and full
submission to their slightest direction, was called “insight” into her mental
illness. In the absence of sufficient
“insight” the Plaintiff could never be recommended by Elgin to the Court for
release from custody at Elgin.
10. On
or about October 18, 2018, Defendant Roberson attempted to seduce the Plaintiff
during a card game in a private booth on the clinical unit, first with
conversation about what a “ladies’ man” he was, to imply that the Plaintiff
would enjoy having a romantic or sexual relationship with him. During card games that they played
almost every night in November, 2018, Defendant Roberson showed Plaintiff his
tattoos, and told her she had to hide her developing feelings for him, because
other staff would notice if she “wore her feelings on her sleeve.”
11. During
October-December 2018, several staff frequently joked around or teased the
Plaintiff and/or Defendant Roberson about how they spent so much time together,
asking, e.g., “What’s going on with you two?”
12. By
December, 2018, Defendant Roberson was frequently coming to Plaintiff’s room on
White cottage and engaging in explicitly sexual kissing and touching activity
with her. This occurred in full
view of Plaintiff’s roommate, whom (along with the Plaintiff) Roberson threatened
and sternly warned not to tell anyone.
13. Plaintiff
attempted to discourage the sexual relationship, telling Defendant Roberson to
“forget it” as early as December 2, 2018.
However he was relentlessly seductive, calling her frequently from his
cell at the patient phone on the unit, and he began to recite various “loving”
intentions and promises, to help her improve her life situation when she would
be released from Elgin.
14. Plaintiff
was expecting an upcoming court decision for her conditional release, and was
unwilling to endanger a favorable ruling by angering a staff member or making
what would become mere he-said-she-said accusations in the lopsided,
“staff-is-always-right/mental-patient-is-always-wrong” venue of Elgin.
15. Plaintiff
was in no position and had no ability to give or withhold “consent” to any
sexual activity or relationship with Defendant Roberson. She was an involuntary psychiatric
patient, a disabled person, relentlessly schooled by Defendant Hussain, the
captain of her treatment team who dictated what her custodial program would be,
that she must obey and defer to staff judgment in all matters concerning
herself, including her own emotions and her own mind. Hussain repeatedly told Plaintiff that
her explanations of incidents or untrue staff reports were irrelevant, because
she was a mental patient and only staff would be believed..
16. Despite
the Plaintiff’s reticence, Defendant Roberson continued his attempts during
December 2018, and promised Plaintiff he would help her earn a degree when she
got out of Elgin, he would find an apartment for her, and he would live with
her and even marry her once he qualified for his retirement pension. He discussed buying her an engagement
ring, saying she would however have to keep it hidden. These promises were combined with the
implicit and omnipresent threat, always in the background: Defendant Roberson
could easily insert reports into her psychiatric chart, which would have been
entirely false but nevertheless believed, saying that she had been the one who
tried to seduce him and characterizing her alleged behavior as symptomatic of
such mental illness as should rule out her release. Thus coerced, the sexual “relationship” continued.
17. After
Plaintiff was conditionally released on January 10, 2019, Defendant Roberson
contacted her at Bryn Mawr Care by cell phone, as he had previously arranged
with her to do. On numerous
occasions in January or early February he picked her up in his car and took her
either (at first) to a hotel in Chicago or (later) to his apartment in Elgin. Plaintiff wanted to have conversations
and discuss the promises he had made and future plans with him, but Roberson
repeatedly showed her that he was only interested in drinking and sex. Plaintiff complied with his demands in
part because he became very angry when he was drunk, and she was alternately afraid
of him or felt sympathy for him. On one occasion, Defendant had to call Plaintiff’s case
worker Alex at Brynn Mawr Care to tell him she would be late coming back, and she
had to have the hotel call a taxi for her to return to her residence because he
was too drunk to drive, after he had already driven his car onto a snow bank.
18. On
or about February 8, 2019, Plaintiff finally managed to call off the relationship
with Roberson. She has not seen
him again in person since then.
19. On
or about July 19, 2019, Defendant Roberson contacted the Plaintiff by phone and
told her that someone had reported their earlier sexual and personal contacts
to the Office of the Inspector General, and that he could be in trouble or even
fired. He clearly hoped that she
would protect him from an expected or ongoing investigation. He did not inform her that he was the
only one in trouble (i.e., she was not), because under Illinois law, any sexual contact at all between
institutional mental health staff and an involuntary patient constitutes a
felony for which the staff can be prosecuted, and that no issue of the
patient’s “consent” is even allowed.
20. During
the phone conversation in July, 2019, Defendant Roberson told the Plaintiff to
lie to police about their relationship.
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1.)
Sexual abuse of a disabled person, false imprisonment/illegal seizure/deprivation
of liberty, denial of due process of law: violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
21. Plaintiff
hereby incorporates Paragraphs 6-20, as if set forth here in their entirety.
22. In
2013, Plaintiff was “hospitalized” as an involuntary psychiatric inpatient
after a verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity pursuant to 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4. She was evaluated as
being in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis and placed in a
secure setting at Elgin Mental Health Center. Such involuntary “hospitalization” is legal only because its purposes do not include
retribution, punishment, or deterrence.
An NGRI verdict is an acquittal
of criminal culpability, and an acquittee may only be involuntarily hospitalized
for treatment of an existing condition of
mental illness. Under the
Constitution of the United States, she may not be hospitalized involuntarily in
the absence of such condition, or in the absence of the possibility of
“adequate and humane care and treatment” [405 ILCS 5/1-101.2] for such
condition, regardless of previous criminal acts (however heinous), and
regardless of any theoretical danger she may pose to herself or others.
23. Even
as a pretrial detainee is presumed innocent, and elaborate procedural rights are
meant to guarantee her fair trial, a forensic psychiatric inpatient is not a
criminal, and elaborate policy protections are meant to guarantee her treatment
for the condition of mental illness.
In both circumstances, the point is to restrain human passion and flawed
reaction in the name of reason and justice. Our law demands criminal procedure for pretrial detainees,
not lynchings; and it also demands medical treatment for NGRI acquittees, not
psychiatric slavery. Mental health
treatment is inextricable from due process of law for the continuing
confinement of any forensic psychiatric patient. Abuse and neglect effectively sabotage mental health
treatment. Pursuant to 405 ILCS
5/2-112, “Every recipient of services in a mental health… facility shall be
free from abuse and neglect.”
“Abuse” is defined under 405 ILCS 5/1-101.1 as “…any physical injury,
sexual abuse, or mental injury inflicted on a recipient of services other than
by accidental means.”
24. Plaintiff
was denied due process of law precisely because the Defendants abused her, and violated
crucial policies, rules and criminal laws, thereby effectively eliminating all
possibility of ameliorative treatment for her condition of mental illness and rendering
her continued confinement, from the time of said violations, as a non-medical,
abusive, and unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, false imprisonment and/or
illegal seizure of plaintiff’s person.
Specifically:
a.
Defendant Roberson seduced or coerced the Plaintiff into a sexual relationship
while he was an employee of the state institution to which she was
involuntarily committed, when she was legally incapable of consent and under
his control. This was a violation
of 720
ILCS 5/11-9.2(a)(2) and 720 ILCS
5/11-9.5, a Class 3 felony.
b.
Defendant Roberson threatened both the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s roommate
with retribution, by saying any report they might make about his sexual
abuse of the Plaintiff would only be said to be a symptom of their mental
illness and justify longer involuntary hospitalization. This was intimidation,
a Class 3 felony under 720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(2), and an attempt and/or
conspiracy to violate 59 Ill. Adm. Code §50.20.
c.
Defendant Hussain actively supported Defendant Roberson’s original
and continuing opportunity to sexually abuse the Plaintiff, by carefully
grooming and schooling the Plaintiff with the idea that mental health
professionals are always right and are believed, whilst mental patients
are always wrong and are not believed.
Defendant was denied all opportunity
to be heard, and called a liar or troublemaker by Defendant Hussain
on several occasions when she complained about staff behavior
or any
abuse of power. Defendant Hussain
made it clear that if Plaintiff wanted to
be conditionally released, she should restrain herself from
complaining about
staff. This was intimidation, a
Class 3 felony under 720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(2),
and an attempt and/or conspiracy to violate 59 Ill. Adm. Code §50.20.
25. Relevant
portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every
person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage
of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution
and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .
26. Plaintiff
at all times referred to in this action was and is a citizen of the United
States and all of the individual Defendants to this claim are persons for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
27. All
individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting
under the color of state law in their capacity as employees of the State of
Illinois, and their acts and/or omissions were conducted under the cover of
their official duties or employment.
28. At
all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had clearly established
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily
integrity and to be free from false imprisonment, illegal seizure of her
person, and deprivation of liberty by employees of the State in the absence of
due process of law and/or in violation of those policies and laws which
specifically or impliedly justify and facilitate involuntary inpatient mental
health treatment.
29. Any
reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the
complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
30. The
actions, deceptions and threats by Defendants Roberson and Hussain, as
described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights. The failure to protect the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, and the use of illegal seizure, false imprisonment, intimidation
and sexual misconduct which amounted to active subversion and sabotage by the
Defendants, and each of them, of that due process of law (treatment) to which
the Plaintiff was entitled, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of the Plaintiff.
31. Neither
Defendant ever took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively
unreasonable and conscience shocking sexual abuse by Defendant Roberson or the
false imprisonment, deprivation of liberty, and intimidation, despite being in
a position to do so. The
Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting
from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking sexual abuse and
other constitutional violations caused by the other Defendant.
32. Defendants
engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in
bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected
constitutional rights.
33. Defendants
engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint with shocking and willful
indifference to Plaintiff's rights, in full conscious awareness that they would
cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
34. The
actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where
the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff,
violated the contemporary standards of decency. At no time was sexual abuse, deception or intimidation
justified by any medical or mental health philosophy or the Plaintiff’s needs;
but it was, entirely, misconduct and
violation by the Defendants, and each of them, of the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights as outlined herein.
35. The
Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of sexual abuse,
deception and intimidation to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to
submit to false imprisonment, unreasonable seizure of her person and
deprivation of liberty which constituted an
unlawful constitutional violation and a stripping away of her dignity and
humanity. The Plaintiff’s future freedom
and wellbeing were completely controlled by the Defendants, whose actions
violated contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not
significant physical injury is evident.
The Defendants used sexual abuse, deception and intimidation in a
willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion, as there was no need for sex at any
time or under any circumstance during the Plaintiff’s confinement, nor was any deception
or intimidation appropriate for a trained, responsible staff member in the
mental health profession.
36. The
Defendants’ sexual abuse, deception and intimidation exceeded any reasonable policy or practice. The use of sexual abuse, and the deception
and intimidation of the Plaintiff resulted in the false imprisonment, seizure
of the Plaintiff’s person, and deprivation of liberty by confinement under an
utterly false guise of mental health treatment, and it is sufficiently
repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.
37. The
acts or omissions of both Defendants were the direct and proximate causes
behind Plaintiff's injuries.
38. The
Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
39. The
acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived
Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
40. The
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of
conduct.
41. As
a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as
described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts
in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
42. On
information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover and may
further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society
through the sexual abuse outlined herein.
43. Plaintiff
is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988,
pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
44. In
addition to compensatory, economic and consequential
damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of Defendant have been
taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the
constitutional rights of the Plaintiff.
2.) Sexual abuse of a disabled person, battery, excessive force, denial
of due process of law: violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
45. Plaintiff
hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this complaint, as if set
forth here in their entirety.
46. Relevant
portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every person,
who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any
state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . .
.
47. Plaintiff
at all times referred to in this action was and is a citizen of the United
States and the Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
48. The
Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under the
color of state law in their capacity as employees of the State of Illinois, and
their acts and/or omissions were conducted under the cover of their official
duties or employment.
49. At
all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established
constitutional right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily
integrity and to be free from excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual
assault by the staff of the State and to due process of law before any force or
battery might be used against her.
50. At
all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established
constitutional right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily
integrity and to be free from sexual abuse, intimidation and psychological
manipulation, by the Defendants and other unknown employees of the State.
51. Any
reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the
complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
52. The
actions, deceptions, intimidation and effective enslavement as well as the use
of force by Defendant Roberson, as described herein, were also malicious and/or
involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's
federally protected rights. The
failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of
unlawful excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual misconduct as well as the
active sabotage of such due process of law (mental treatment) to which
Plaintiff was constitutionally entitled, by the Defendants, and each of them,
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff.
53. The
force used constituted excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse
which could have caused and did cause serious injury to the Plaintiff.
54. Neither
of the Defendants took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the
objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking excessive force, assault,
battery, and sexual abuse by Defendant Roberson despite being in a position to
do so. The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages
resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking force and
other constitutional violations caused by each other Defendant.
55. Defendants
engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in
bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected
constitutional rights.
56. Defendants
engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint with shocking and willful
indifference to Plaintiff's rights, in full conscious awareness that they would
cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
57. The
actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where
the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff,
violated contemporary standards of decency. At no time was such “treatment” justified by any medical or
mental health philosophy, by the Plaintiff’s needs, or by policies and considerations
of security, but was, entirely, misconduct
by the Defendants, and each of them, in violation of Plaintiff’s Constituional
Rights as outlined herein.
58. The
Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause
harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to submit to excessive
force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse which constituted an unlawful bodily touching and stripping away her
dignity and humanity by submitting to Defendant Roberson, who controlled the
Plaintiff’s freedom and wellbeing.
Such actions violate contemporary standards of decency, regardless of
whether or not significant physical injury is evident. The Defendants used force in a willful,
wanton and unnecessary fashion, as there was no need for sex at any time or
under any circumstance during the Plaintiff’s confinement, nor was any force, assault,
battery, and/or sexual activity appropriate for
a trained, responsible staff member in the mental health profession.
59. The
Defendants’ excessive force, assault, battery, and sexual abuse exceeded any reasonable use of force as no force was
required whatsoever. The use of
force involving the sexual battery and enslavement of the Plaintiff constitutes
sexual assault, battery, and excessive
force under the guise of treatment. Such a use of force is so repugnant as to shock
the conscience of mankind.
60. The
acts or omissions of both Defendants were the direct and
proximate causes behind Plaintiff's
injuries.
61. The
Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
62. The
acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived
Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
63. The
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of
conduct.
64. As
a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as
described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts
in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
65. On
information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover and may
further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of
society through the sexual abuses outlined herein.
66. Plaintiff
is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988,
pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
67. In
addition to compensatory, economic and consequential
damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each Defendant have been taken
maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff.
VI. PRAYER
FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff
prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against each of the
Defendants and grant:
A. compensatory and consequential damages,
including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to
be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;
B. economic losses on all claims allowed by
law;
C.
punitive
damages on all claims allowed by law against Defendants and in an amount to be
determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;
D.
attorneys’
fees and costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, including
expert witness fees, on all claims allowed by law;
E.
pre-
and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;
F.
Court-ordered
equitable and injunctive relief from all contact or communication by the
Defendants, including any further sexual advances, assaults or seductive
communication from the Defendants; and
G.
Any
further relief that this Court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate
relief at law and equity.
PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.
Respectfully
submitted,
__/s/
S. Randolph Kretchmar______________
S.
Randolph Kretchmar
One
of the Attorneys for the Plaintiff
The Law Offices of Kretchmar & Cecala, P.C.
1170 Michigan Avenue, Wilmette, IL 60091
847-370-5410
