Friday, November 3, 2017

HURT V. CORCORAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

            BENAHDAM HURT                                                )
                                                                                    )
Plaintiff,         )
                                                                                    )
v.                                                  )
                                 )              Case No. 14 C 5987
JAMES PATRICK CORCORAN in his   )
official capacity as Medical Director of    )
Elgin Mental Health Center and      )     
individually, ELGIN MENTAL HEALTH   )
CENTER a body public, ILLINOIS      )
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a   )      JURY DEMAND
Department of the State of Illinois, CHRISTY   )
LENHARDT individually, HASINA JAVED,   )
individually, WILLIAM EPPERSON,       )
individually, ROBERT HAMLIN,      )
individually, BRIAN DAWSON individually   )
and in his official capacity as Hospital       )
Administrator of Elgin Mental Health Center,    )
and WAYNE BEYER, individually,      )
                                                                                    )
Defendants.                              )


COMPLAINT FOR DMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF

WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY




Now comes the Plaintiff, Benahdam Hurt, by and through his attorneys, the Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, PC, with his complaint against the above named Defendants and requests trial by jury, and in support of his Complaint states as follows.

I.               INTRODUCTION

 

1.         This is an action brought by Benahdam Hurt, a person confined to the Elgin Mental Health Center (“Facility”) at all times relevant to the claims in this Complaint, to vindicate profound deprivations of his constitutional rights caused by institutionally based brutality, and institutionally organized sexual abuse.
2.          



II.             JURISDICTION, VENUE AND  NOTICE


61.  This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1of the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201.
62.  This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 as the judicial district in which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.

III.           PARTIES


63. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Marci Webber was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States of America.
64.      At all times relevant hereto, Defendant William Epperson was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Defendant William Epperson is sued individually.
65.      At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Gloria Langunilla was a citizen of the
United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility. Defendant Gloria Langunilla is sued individually.
66.     At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Gus Cabazuda was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility. Defendant Cabazuda is sued individually.
67.     At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Syed Hussain was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility. Defendant Syed Hussain is sued individually.
68.     At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Chriselda Rana was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility. Defendant Chriselda Rana is sued individually.
69.     At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Vicky Sandhu was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility. Defendant Vicky Sandhu is sued individually.
70.    Defendants Illinois Department of Human Services (“Defendant State”) and Elgin Mental Health Center (“Facility” or “State Facility”) are Illinois body publics and legal entities responsible for themselves and for the Elgin Mental Health Center. These Defendants employ the individual Defendants and are proper entities to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
71.     At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Illinois. Defendant Jeffrey Pharis is sued in his official capacity as the Chief of the Elgin Mental Health Center, employed by the Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or the Elgin Mental Health Center, and was acting under color of state law. Defendant Jeffrey Pharis is also sued individually.
72.     As the Chief of the Elgin Mental Health Center, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis both exercised and delegated his final decision making power to the staff and the individual Defendants of the Elgin Mental Health Center. On information and belief, he also trained and supervised individual Defendants.
73.     Defendant State and Defendant Facility/State Facility and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis are properly sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their own and their delegated deliberately indifferent unconstitutional decisions, policies, practice, habits, customs, usages, training and derelict supervision, ratification, acquiescence and intentional failures which were moving forces in the complained of constitutional and statutory violations and resulting injuries.
74.     The Defendant State and Defendant Facility are also properly sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the challenged delegated final decisions of Defendant Jeffrey Pharis in his official capacity as the Chief of the Elgin Mental Health Center, and for those of any final delegated decision makers, with respect to the hereinafter challenged deliberately indifferent policies, decisions, widespread habits, customs, usages and practices.

IV. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS REGARDING

THE MAY 3, 2014, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 2014,

FORCED DRUGGING INCIDENTS

 

75.     Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs, including the allegations in the Introduction, as if they were fully set forth at length.
76.     At the time that the Plaintiff was asked to see the nurse on May 3, 2014, she was in her room, sitting and calmly speaking to her roommate.
77.     At the time that the Plaintiff was asked to see the nurse, she was not creating a threat to herself, other patients or staff.
78.     Staff member Zella Napier made the initial contact with Plaintiff during this request to visit the nurse.
79.      Napier instructed Plaintiff to see the nurse and the Plaintiff objected to any necessity to her going to see the nurse for any medical reason.
80.      Napier observed the Plaintiff in her room and the Plaintiff did not threaten Napier, other patients or staff, and the Plaintiff did not have any weapons.
81.      Napier next told the Plaintiff to walk to see the nurse and, although the Plaintiff verbally stated that she did not want to see the nurse, the Plaintiff volunteered to see the nurse in full compliance with the Napier’s order and without threat of harm to herself, Napier or any other person.
82.     Napier escorted the Plaintiff from her room to the medical treatment room, a distance of over 100 feet, without resistance, threat of harm, argument or any other action by the Plaintiff that would have required her to be restrained for any reason whatsoever.
83.     Defendant William Epperson, a security guard, and Defendant Gus Cabazuda, a security guard, confronted the Plaintiff in the men’s day room and accompanied her to the medical treatment room; and at the time that these Defendant security guards confronted her, the Plaintiff presented herself in a cooperative, calm and compliant fashion, and she represented no risk or threat of harm to herself, the staff or other patients of the facility.
84.     During this time, Defendant Gloria Langunilla, a nurse, was positioned in the medical treatment room, and Defendant Gloria Langunilla had prepared a syringe to forcibly deliver a shot of Lorazepam, a narcotic sedative, a powerful drug that causes sedation and other side effects, to be delivered forcibly to the Plaintiff’s body.
85.     Defendants William Epperson and Gus Cabazuda used excessive force handling the body of the Plaintiff in order to bend her over at the waist, pull her pants down and permit the forcible drugging of the Plaintiff by Defendant Gloria Langunilla while staff member Zella Napier stood by and watched.
86.     The Plaintiff objected to the administration of the unnecessary drugs, and to the excessive use of force against her body, and to forced drugging without following such due process of law as is promulgated by the State of Illinois.
87.     Plaintiff’s statements were constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
88.     The Plaintiff did not struggle or resist Defendants’ unwanted and forcible pinning of her body either before or during the incident on May 3, 2014, but acted deferentially and submitted to the Defendants, further showing that she was not a threat.
89.     The individual Defendants were irate at the Plaintiff’s questioning of their legal authority and medical status by a patient.
90.     While Defendants held the Plaintiff down during the May 3, 2014 forced drugging, Defendant William Epperson said “you don’t want us to put you in restraints,” so as to threaten the Plaintiff with additional force, intimidate her and humiliate her should she not continue to submit to being held down, stripped and drugged.
91.     All of the actions of the Defendants on May 3, 2014, and September 16, 2014, were done without any justification or provocation.
92.     At the time of the September 16, 2014, forced drugging, Plaintiff was under close observation 1:1, not for protection against any harm she was threatening to herself or anyone else, but for protection against harm others were threatening against her.
93.     Plaintiff was not suicidal and had given no indication that she might hurt herself or anyone else at the time of the September 16, 2014 forced drugging.
94.     Defendant Hussain’s expressed annoyance at Plaintiff’s questions and the book she was reading, immediately prior to ordering the forced drugging on September 16, 2014, demonstrated his unreasoned animus over Plaintiff’s disagreements with his continuing insistence that she would benefit from taking psychiatric drugs and his flat refusal to acknowledge the bad side effects she had suffered when taking them.
95.     The insistence by staff member Marva Stroud upon close and intimate physical control over the manner in which Plaintiff was lying in her bed and how she held her bed covers on September 16, 2014, was not justified by any reasonable fear about the Plaintiff’s behavior, but was intended to torment, humiliate and antagonize the Plaintiff.
96.     As a result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff was drugged on Defendant Hussain’s order and suffered humiliation and exacerbation of her inability to make progress toward recovery and she experienced, and continues to experience, traumatic effects in her body from drugs and a hostile, unstable living environment.
97.     To provide cover and divert from liability for the initiation and continuation of the unprovoked attacks, staff members Marva Stroud and Velma Westbrook falsely and outrageously fabricated information in the Plaintiff’s treatment chart.
98.     Stroud fabricated and planted evidence in the Plaintiff’s chart, knowing it to be false and that it would be used to justify the retaliation against the Plaintiff for questioning the arbitrary removal of Plaintiff’s snack privilege earlier that day.
99.     Defendants William Epperson, Gus Cabazuda and Gloria Langunilla battered the Plaintiff on May 3, 2014, subjecting her to excessive and unreasonable force.
100.  Plaintiff was battered and forced to endure humiliating exposure by removal of her clothing and injection of harmful, dangerous and medically unnecessary drugs on May 3, 2014.
101.  Defendants Syed Hussain, Criselda Rana and Vicky Sandhu battered the Plaintiff on September 16, 2014, subjecting her to excessive and unreasonable force.
102.  Plaintiff was battered and forced to endure humiliating and frightening, abrupt abandonment when she collapsed on the floor following the forced injection of harmful, dangerous and medically unnecessary drugs on September 16, 2014.
103.  All of the individual Defendants engaged in the unprovoked attacks on the Plaintiff.  None of the Defendants took any steps to protect the Plaintiff against the other Defendants’ use of excessive force, despite being in a position and having a duty to do so.
104.  Amplifying the excessive nature of the scene is the fact that Defendant guards clandestinely positioned themselves after staff member Napier used trickery to make the Plaintiff vulnerable to this one-sided attack on May 3, 2014.
105.  Immediately following the attack of May 3, 2014, the Plaintiff requested an
attorney call.
106. Defendant William Epperson attempted to dissuade the Plaintiff from reporting
the attack to legal counsel, stating, “Your attorney won’t be available now.”
107.  Plaintiff proceeded to insist on her right to contact her attorney, and only after
much insistence was Plaintiff given the right to call her attorney and leave him a message.
108.  In their angst to divert liability and cover up their brutal attacks on a
defenseless patient and/or, on information and belief, with knowledge that Plaintiff had already complained against them to her counsel, Defendants and staff member guards and nurses next conspired and/or acted in concert to have Plaintiff falsely accused of threatening the staff, other patients and acting in a harmful way to herself by fabrication of information in the Plaintiff’s medical chart.
109.  At the times of these incidents, Plaintiff was an unarmed female about 165 pounds, 5’ 1" tall, 47 years old, no match for two grown male guards.
110. Staff member Marva Stroud falsely reported in her far-fetched chart
statement about the May 3, 2014 incident: “(Plaintiff was) continuing to walk closer to Velma I then step (sic) in front of her and again tried to redirect her but she still wouldn’t stop she then tried to get around me to get at Velma. The nurse tried to intervene but she still wouldn’t stop so security was called. No other inc (sic) then security intervene.”
111.   Staff member Velma Westbrook amplified Stroud’s false story. She falsely reported that even the threat of violence and intimidation tactics of the arbitrary privilege restriction had no effect, requiring the battery and forced drugging: “(Plaintiff was) loud and disrupted (sic), causing the mileu (sic) to be unstable making other residents agitated.”
112.   All of the above-described acts were done by the Defendants intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously and/or recklessly in disregard for Plaintiff’s federally protected rights, and were done pursuant to the preexisting and ongoing deliberately indifferent official custom, practice, decision, policy, training, and supervision of the Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis acting under color of state law.
113.   With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from excessive force, the Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to a dangerous environment of patient brutality and unlawful drugging by:
a.    failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the constitutional limitations on the use of force and unlawful forced drugging;

b.    by failing to adequately punish unconstitutional uses of force and unlawful forced drugging;

c.    by ordering and tolerating the use of unconstitutional force and unlawful forced drugging;

d.    by ongoingly failing to properly or neutrally investigate complaints of excessive force and unlawful forced drugging; and,

e.    by ordering, tolerating, encouraging, and permitting collusive statements by involved Defendants and other staff of the State in such situations.

114.   It is the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom, habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendant State, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis and the Defendant Facility to order and permit staff members to use excessive force, battery and unlawful forced drugging against individuals when such use is unnecessary and unjustified, as well as to fail to supervise and to train staff in the appropriate constitutional limits on the use of force and forced drugging, knowing that these staff members are significant to the protection of the constitutional rights of the patients and therefore pose a significant risk of injury to the public who are patients at the Defendant Facility.
115.   With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from excessive force in the care and treatment received at EMHC, the Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to unconstitutional and abusive uses of force and forced drugging under the auspices of “mental health treatment” by:
a.   failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the rights of citizens to be free from force and forced drugging in mental health facilities;

b.  failing to adequately punish retaliatory forced drugging actions;

c.   ongoingly ordering and tolerating unlawful forced drugging, excessive force, and manipulation-based selective treatment among the staff and in decisions regarding the ongoing incarceration of those found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity; and

d.  failing to properly investigate complaints of unlawful forced drugging, use of medical charts for punishment of patients, animus based on a patients’ unwillingness to be forcibly drugged, and toleration of collusive statements by involved staff in such situations.

116.  It is the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom,
habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendant State, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis and Defendant Facility, to order as well as to permit staff to use force, forced drugging and animus against patients who refuse psychotropic drug “treatment” as motivating factors in staff decisions and actions, as well as to fail to supervise and to train staff in the rights of citizens to be free from unconstitutional, violent actions and collusive decision making by facility staff.
117. With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from
retaliation for exercising their constitutional rights, the Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to a dangerous environment of staff retaliation to the exercise of such rights by:
a.     failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the protected speech and due process rights of citizens to question the actions of staff without retaliation;
b.     failing to adequately punish retaliation by staff against the public who are patients at the facility and who exercise their protected speech and due process rights to object to staff conduct;
c.     ordering and tolerating the use of retaliation based on protected speech and due process rights; and
d.     ongoingly failing to properly investigate complaints of retaliation for exercising their constitutional rights.

118.        It is the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom, habit
practice and/or policy of the Defendant State, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis and the Defendant Facility to order and permit staff members to retaliate against individuals for exercising First Amendment Rights, as well as to fail to supervise and to train staff in the constitutional rights of individuals.
119.       With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from
excessive use of force and forced drugging, the Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to the excessive force and forced drugging of the patients and the cover up of efforts by staff when they have failed to investigate complaints of staff misconduct, instead accepting “medical chart” accounts of events without question and rubber stamping any staff accounts given.
120. It is the longstanding and widespread custom, habit, practice and/or
policy of the Defendants State, Jeffrey Pharis and Facility to find no fault with staff conduct as long as any story is offered by staff, regardless of how incredible.
121. Defendant Jeffery Pharis orders the senior staff to routinely ratify, acquiesce, rubber stamp, and tolerate the malicious collusive conduct and unconstitutional actions of staff by routinely ignoring serious complaints of retaliatory forced drugging and other violent retaliation, as well as fabrication of evidence by the staff.  The Defendants State and Jeffrey Pharis did exactly that in this case.
122. These final policy decisions by Defendant Jeffrey Pharis in his role as the
final delegated policy decision maker with respect to reviewing misconduct create liability for Defendant State and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis. They are also further evidence of the ongoing and deliberately indifferent custom, habit, policy, decision, practice, training and supervision of the staff of the Defendant Facility, wherein the Defendants State and Jeffrey Pharis order, tolerate and encourage lawlessness and disregard for the federal rights of patients.
123. In the period addressed by this Complaint, and before and since the events
described herein, Defendant Jeffrey Pharis has declared or suggested that other complaints of excessive force and unlawful forcible drugging and outrageous actions by staff were unfounded, without serious investigation, and he has provided cover-up support to members of the staff who were violating the constitutional and statutory rights of patients under Defendant Pharis’ orders.
124. On information and belief, because of this utter failure of supervision and
oversight as well as the direct orders of Defendant Pharis, the Plaintiff reasonably expects to continue to be hurt by the same Defendants named in this Complaint, who have been the subject of complaints both prior to and since May 2014, and these injuries are ongoing to the present time.
125. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of each of the
Defendants, Plaintiff has been substantially injured. These injuries include, but are not limited to, loss of constitutional and federal rights, physical injuries, physical and mental impairments and disfigurement, great pain and emotional distress, and/or aggravation of pre-existing conditions, and ongoing special damages for medically/psychologically related treatment caused by the unconstitutional and brutal concerted conduct of all these Defendants.
126. The Plaintiff is now suffering from these injuries, with an inability to
consistently live without fear of retaliation from the very staff charged with the responsibility to enable her treatment or rehabilitation.
127. The Plaintiff also suffers persisting emotional damage the extent of which
has not yet been fully ascertained.  Plaintiff continues to suffer ongoing emotional distress, with significant stress related symptoms, including fear, sadness, humiliation, anxiety, stress, anger, depression, frustration, occasional sleeplessness, nightmares and flashbacks, from being violently treated like this.
128. Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages on all of her claims against
the individual Defendants personally, to redress their willful, malicious, wanton, reckless and fraudulent conduct.

V.       CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 -Excessive Force in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment on May 3, 2014 (Against Defendants Epperson, Cabazuda, and Langunilla.)


129.Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if
fully set forth at length herein.
130.Relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

131. Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and all of the
individual Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
132. All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto,
were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as staff of the State and/or Defendant Facility and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment.
133.   On May 3, 2014, at the time of the complained of events of the first shot, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force by the staff of the State.
134.   Any reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
135.  The actions and use of force by Defendants Epperson, Cabazuda and Langunilla, as described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights. The force and failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of unlawful forced drugging by these Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff.
136.  The force used constituted aggravated battery in that it could have caused and did cause serious bodily injury through use of drugs.
137.  None of the Defendants took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking excessive force of other Defendants or from the excessive force of later unlawful forced drugging despite being in a position to do so. The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking force of each other Defendant.
138.  Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected constitutional rights.
139.  They did so with shocking and willful indifference to Plaintiff's rights and their conscious awareness that they would cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
140.The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff violates the contemporary standards of decency.
141. The Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to submit to administration of drugs, unlawful bodily touching and stripping away her clothing by two male staff members violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident.  The Defendants used force in a willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion as no need for application of any force was evident when compared with any threat reasonably perceived by the responsible staff.
142.The Defendants’ excessive force exceeded any reasonable use of force as
no force was required whatsoever.  The use of force to pull the Plaintiff’s pants down while holding her down over an examination table bent at the waste and exposing her to male staff is a use of force so repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.
143.The acts or omissions of all individual Defendants were the direct and
proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries.
144.  These individual Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
145.  The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
146.  These individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
147.  The Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting pursuant to municipal/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining to Plaintiff.
148. As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
149. On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover in the environment she resides in and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the prolonged incarceration and remediation of false reports used to cover-up Defendants retaliatory use of excessive force and unlawful forced drugging. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
150. In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the individually named Defendants under  42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of these individual Defendants have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 -Excessive Force in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment on September 16, 2014 (Against Defendants Hussain, Sandhu, and Rana.)

151.Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if
fully set forth at length herein.
152. Relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

153. Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and all of the
individual Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
154. All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto,
were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as staff of the State and/or Defendant Facility and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment.
155.All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto,
were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as staff of the State and/or Defendant Facility and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment.
156.   On September 16, 2014, at the time of the complained of events of the second shot, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force by the staff of the State.
157.   Any reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
158.  The actions and use of force by Defendants Hussain, Sandhu and Rana, as described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights. The force and failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of unlawful forced drugging by these Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff.
159.  The force used constituted aggravated battery in that it could have caused and did cause serious bodily injury through use of drugs.
160.  None of the Defendants took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking excessive force of other Defendants or from the excessive force of later unlawful forced drugging despite being in a position to do so. The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking force of each other Defendant.
161.  Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected constitutional rights.
162.  They did so with shocking and willful indifference to Plaintiff's rights and their conscious awareness that they would cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
163. The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to herself, other patients or staff, violate the contemporary standards of decency.
164. The Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing her to submit to administration of multiple unknown drugs, followed by immediate abandonment.
165. The Defendants’ excessive force exceeded any reasonable use of force as
no force was required whatsoever.  The use of force to simultaneously inject the Plaintiff in both arms while she lay helpless and begging for mercy on the floor is a use of force so repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.  The Defendants used force in a willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion as no need for application of any force was evident when compared with any threat reasonably perceived by the responsible staff.
166.  The acts or omissions of all individual Defendants were the direct and proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries.
167.  These individual Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
168.  The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and caused her other damages.
169.  These individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
170.  The Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting pursuant to municipal/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining to Plaintiff.
171. As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling her to compensatory and special damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
172. On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover in the environment she resides in and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the prolonged incarceration and remediation of false reports used to cover-up Defendants retaliatory use of excessive force and unlawful forced drugging. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
173. In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the individually named Defendants under  42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of these individual Defendants have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 -Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment (Against Defendants Epperson, Cabazuda, Langunilla, Hussain, Sandhu, and Rana.)

174. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if
fully set forth at length herein.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

176. Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and all of the
individual Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
177. All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were
acting under the color of state law in their capacity as staff members of the State and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment.
    178. On May 3, 2014, and September 16, 2014, at the times of the complained of events, Plaintiff had the clearly established constitutional right to be free from retaliation for the exercise of protected speech.
179. Any reasonable staff member knew or should have known of this right at
the time of the complained of conduct as it was clearly established at that time.

180. Plaintiff exercised her constitutionally protected right to question staff for

arbitrary enforcement of restrictions and counter-therapeutic insults and escalations of hostility between staff and patients; and also exercised her constitutionally protected right to assert, proclaim or promote the statutory rights of patients to refuse psychiatric drugs; and/or also engaged in protected speech related to the constitutional rights of citizens with respect to seizures of their body by the State and objectionable conduct by staff of State.

181. Retaliatory animus for Plaintiff's exercise of her constitutionally protected
rights – to question staff and voice her own opinions regarding the scope of the staff’s legal authority to restrict patients, engage in obviously counter-therapeutic insults and hostility toward patients, seize the body of a patient, or force the person of the Plaintiff or another patient to be medically treated through battery and forced drugging – was a substantially motivating factor in the excessive force used by individual Defendants.
182.The excessive force used against Plaintiff on May 3, 2014, and again on
September 16, 2014, in retaliation for her protected conduct would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct.
183. All of these individual Defendanta and other staff participated in this use
of force as a means of retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of her protected speech.  None of the Defendants or other staff took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from this retaliation for the exercise of her protected speech. The individual Defendants are each liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable conduct that shocks the conscience of mankind.
184.Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully,
maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s federally protected constitutional rights.
185.The acts or omissions of all individual Defendants were direct and
proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries and deprivation of her rights.
186. The individual Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
187.  The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional and statutory rights and caused her other damages.
188.  Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
189. The Defendants to this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting
pursuant to State/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining to Plaintiff.
190. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling her to compensatory damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
191. On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover in the
environment where she resides in and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the prolonged incarceration and remediation of false reports used to cover-up Defendants’ retaliatory use of excessive force and unlawful forced drugging.  Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
192. In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential, Plaintiff is
entitled to punitive damages against each of the individually named Defendants under  42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of these individual Defendants have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Direct Orders and Deliberately Indifferent Policies, Practices, Customs, Training, and Supervision in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments
(Against Defendant State, Defendant Facility and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis.)

193.Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if
fully set forth herein.
194.   42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

195. Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and Defendants
to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
196. The Defendants to this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting
under the color of state law.
197. Plaintiff had the following clearly established rights at the time of the
complained of conduct:

a.      the right to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force and forcible drugging by State’s staff under the Fourteenth Amendment;

b.     the right to exercise her constitutional rights of free speech under the First Amendment without retaliation;

198.  Defendant Jeffrey Pharis, Defendant Facility and Defendant State knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
199.  The acts or omissions of these Defendants, as described herein, deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional and statutory rights and caused her other damages.
200. The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally
deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional and statutory rights and caused her other damages.
201. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
202.  Defendant Jeffrey Pharis, Defendant Facility and Defendant State were, at all times relevant, policymakers for the Defendant Facility, Defendant State and Defendant Facility, and in that capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the same and gave direct orders to violate the Plaintiff’s rights in this case.
203.   These Defendants ordered and committed the actions, developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, which were direct and proximate causes behind the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional and federal rights as set forth herein and in the other claims, all of which resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various available alternatives.
204.    Defendant Jeffrey Pharis, Defendant Facility and the Defendant State have ordered, created and tolerated an atmosphere of lawlessness, and have developed and maintained long-standing, institution-wide customs, punishment and enforcement related policies, procedures, customs, practices, and/or failed to properly train and/or supervise its staff in a manner amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and of the public.
205.  In light of the duties and responsibilities of those staff that participate in controlling/redirecting the behavior of recipients of services and preparation of reports on alleged threats to others, the need for specialized training and supervision is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and/or supervision is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional and federal rights such as those described herein that the failure to provide such specialized training and supervision is deliberately indifferent to those rights.
206.   The unlawful orders and deliberately indifferent training and supervision provided by Defendant State, Defendant Facility and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives available to Defendant State, Defendant Facility and Defendant Jeffrey Pharis and were direct and proximate causes in the constitutional and federal violation injuries complained of by Plaintiff.
207. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, continues to suffer present adverse effects and deprivations of her rights, and reasonably fears that she will suffer the same adverse effects and deprivations in the future, thereby entitling her to injunctive relief.
208. Plaintiff continues to suffer loss of opportunity and ability to recover in
the environment she resides in, and will further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the prolonged incarceration and remediation of false reports used to cover-up Defendants’ retaliatory use of excessive force and unlawful forced drugging. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
209.   Plaintiff seeks appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to redress Defendants' above described ongoing deliberate indifference in policies, practices, habits, customs, usages, training and supervision with respect to the rights described herein, and with respect to the ongoing policy and/or practice of the State in failing to investigate or appropriately handle complaints of the same, which Defendants have no intention for voluntarily correcting despite obvious need and requests for such correction.

VI.           PRAYER FOR RELIEF


Plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against each of the Defendants and grant:
A.    compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

B.    economic losses on all claims allowed by law;

C.    punitive damages on all claims allowed by law against individual Defendants and in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

D.    attorneys' fees and the costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, including expert witness fees, on all claims allowed by law;

E.    pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;

F.     Court ordered equitable and injunctive relief from enforced drugging, battery or other staff policies or orders that would cause Plaintiff to be forcibly drugged; and,

G.    any further relief that this court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate relief at law and equity.

PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.

Respectfully submitted,



   /s/ S. Randolph Kretchmar                         
S. Randolph Kretchmar
One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff

Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, PC.
1170 Michigan Avenue
Wilmette, IL 60091
847-370-5410

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