Wednesday, January 24, 2018

OWENS V. CORCORAN (Amended Complaint with 3rd Claim)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION


MARK OWENS                                                  )
                                                                             )
                        Plaintiff,                                       )
                                                                             )
            v.                                                              )  Case No.
                                                                             ) 1:18-cv-00334
JAMES PATRICK CORCORAN, in his             )       
Official capacity as Medical Director of             )  Hon. Andrea
Elgin Mental Health Center; and                        )  R. Wood, 
Individually, ELGIN MENTAL HEALTH         )  presiding
CENTER, a body public; the ILLINOIS            )
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,       )
a Department of the State of Illinois;                 )
CHRISTY LENHARDT, individually;              )  JURY
HASINA JAVED, individually; FAISA             DEMAND
KAREEMI, individually; BRIAN DAWSON,   )
in his official capacity as Hospital                      )
Administrator of Elgin Mental Health                )
Center and individually; WILLIAM                   )
EPPERSON, individually; and WAYNE            )
BEYER, individually,                                         )
                                                                            )
                        Defendants.                                 )


AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF
WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY


            NOW COMES Plaintiff, Mark Owens, by and through his attorneys, the Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, P.C., with his complaint against the above named Defendants, and requests trial by jury.  In support of his Complaint, Plaintiff states as follows.

INTRODUCTION

1.  This action is brought by Mark Owens (“Plaintiff”), a person confined to one or another state-operated mental health center (“Facility” or “state facility”) at all times relevant to the claims in this Complaint, to vindicate profound deprivations of his constitutional rights caused by institutionally based brutality, and institutionally organized sexual abuse amounting to sexual slavery.
2.  Plaintiff was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in the Circuit Court of Will County, for a criminal charge of disarming a police officer.  In August, 2011, he was committed to the custody of Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for inpatient mental health treatment, initially at Chester Mental Health Center and subsequently at Elgin Mental Health Center.
3.  Upon his transfer to Elgin, Plaintiff was assigned to receive clinical treatment on L Unit.  The social worker in charge of maintaining and administering his mental health records and coordinating the several specialists on the treatment team was Defendant Christy Lenhardt (“Lenhardt”).  Over several years, Plaintiff was housed on L Unit and the close-by K Unit.  The clinical staff on K and L Units worked together and were familiar with each other’s patients.  Plaintiff also spent a brief period on N Unit.
4.  Within a few months of Plaintiff’s arrival in this clinical setting, Defendant Lenhardt took the opportunity of a private counseling session with the Plaintiff to attempt to seduce him.  She complained to him that her own relationship with her husband was “not fun” and began to cry.  She then pulled her chair uncomfortably close to where the Plaintiff was sitting, in a position that allowed her hands to be between his legs, very close to his crotch area.
5.  Plaintiff immediately became nervous, pointedly excused himself and moved back, and then left Defendant Lenhardt’s office to end the inappropriate situation and avoid the seduction attempt of his social worker, whom he had believed was supposed to be delivering mental health counseling. 
6.  Subsequently, Plaintiff asked Defendant Lenhardt if his counseling sessions could be done somewhere other than in her private office, for example in the N Unit day room, which was more public and would not so easily enable or permit any inappropriate behavior.
7.  Lenhardt was quite irritated by Plaintiff’s request, reacting to his earlier rejection of her sexual advance by implying that Plaintiff was “paranoid”.  She shortly suggested to the team psychiatrist, Defendant Hasina Javed (“Javed”) that Plaintiff’s diagnosis should be changed to bipolar disorder, a major mental illness that could require stronger medication (specifically, the antipsychotic drug Abilify), which would have caused the Plaintiff severe and painful side effects, agitation and memory loss.
8.  Fortunately, Plaintiff was able to prevail upon Dr. Javed not to follow Lenhardt’s suggestion.  He described the general details and clear impropriety of Lenhardt’s earlier sexual advance during a therapy session, and appealed to Javed’s conscience as a practicing Muslim.
9.  Although she apparently found Plaintiff’s report credible to some degree (because she declined to follow Lenhardt’s recommendations regarding Plaintiff’s diagnosis and prescription), Javed never reported the alleged incident to the Office of the Inspector General.  An immediate report to OIG was in fact mandated by statute and by written DHS policy.  Such a report would have been the only effective solution to the situation, and such a report alone would have protected the Plaintiff and other patients at Defendant Facility from future sexual abuse by Defendant Lenhardt. 
10.  Patients’ insight into their own mental health condition and patients’ own treatment preferences are vital considerations.   Without common goals and collaboration between a patient and a treatment team, the chance of mental health treatment success is substantially reduced.  On L Unit, Defendant Lenhardt had her own consistent, covert agenda for sexual relations with the Plaintiff. Meanwhile when the Plaintiff was on K Unit, Defendant Kareemi proved to be inexplicably prejudiced toward a different diagnosis of lifelong major mental illness for him: schizoaffective disorder, which the Plaintiff did not understand and with which he could not agree, and which implied the prescription of stronger, debilitating anti-psychotic drugs that the Plaintiff was loath to take.
10.  By information and belief, all of the named individual defendants colluded actively or passively to hold the Plaintiff against his will in the Facility, and to thereby make him available at Defendant Lenhardt’s disposal for her own personal, perverted purpose of sexual abuse.
11.  During the ensuing months and years, Plaintiff was repeatedly sexually abused by Defendant Lenhardt, on at least three more occasions.  Without any action in response to Plaintiff’s initial report to Defendant Javed in 2012, and with Defendant Lenhardt’s continuing official authority and position of power on Plaintiff’s treatment team, Plaintiff concluded that he had no choice but to comply with Lenhardt’s sexual advances or be diagnosed and drugged into a zombie state.  The clear message of the whole clinical regime in the Defendant Facility was that full compliance with staff judgments or recommendations for whatever might be called “treatment” was mandatory, if a patient wanted to make any progress toward release.  Thus, if his social worker wanted to have sex with him, Plaintiff was convinced he had best go along with it. Defendant Lenhardt strongly “came on” to the Plaintiff so as to make her willful and wanton sexual assault into sexual battery, unlawfully touching and engaging in sex acts with the Plaintiff who was confined, imprisoned, under her complete control, and under the control of her fellow staff on K and L Units who could change his diagnosis and drug him at their whim..

II.   JURISDICTION, VENUE AND NOTICE

            12.  This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201.
            13.  This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, as the judicial district in which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.

III.   PARTIES

            14.  At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Mark Owens was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States of America.
            15.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant James Patrick Corcoran was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Corcoran is sued in his official capacity as Medical Director of Defendant Facility, in which capacity he was at all times relevant a direct senior of Defendants Javed and Kareemi.  Corcoran is also sued individually.
            16.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Christy Lenhardt was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Lenhardt is sued individually.
            17.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Faisa Kareemi was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility, and as a psychiatrist on K Unit.  Kareemi is sued individually.
            18.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hasina Javed was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility, and as a psychiatrist on L Unit.  Javed is sued individually.
            19.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant William Epperson was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Epperson is sued individually.
            20.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Wayne Beyer was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Beyer is sued individually.
            21.  At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Brian Dawson was a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States, and was acting under color of state law in her capacity as an officer employed by Defendant Illinois Department of Human Services and/or of the Defendant Facility.  Dawson is sued in his official capacity as Hospital Administrator of Defendant Facility, and is also sued individually.
            22.  Defendants Illinois Department of Human Services (“State”) and Elgin Mental Health Center (“Facility”) are Illinois body publics and legal entities responsible for themselves and for the Elgin Mental Health Center.  These Defendants employ the individual Defendants and are proper entities to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
            23.  Defendant State, Defendant Facility and Defendants Dawson and Corcoran are properly sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their own and their delegated deliberately indifferent, unconstitutional decisions, policies, practices, habits, customs, derelict training and supervision, ratification, acquiescence and intentional failures which were moving forces in the complained of constitutional and statutory violations and resulting injuries.
            24.  Defendants State and Facility are also properly sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the challenged delegated final decisions of Defendant Brain Dawson in his official capacity as Hospital Administrator of Defendant Facility, and for the challenged delegated final decisions of Defendant James Patrick Corcoran in his official capacity as Medical Director of Defendant Facility, and for those of any other final delegated decision makers, with respect to the hereinafter challenged deliberately indifferent policies, decisions, widespread habits, customs, usages and practices.

IV.  THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF A DISABLED PERSON, AND VIOLATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AROSE FROM DELIBERATE AND COMPLICIT ACTIONS AND OMISSIONS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW BY ALL INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, BY CORCORAN AND DAWSON ACTING IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, AND BY FACILITY AND STATE.
 
            25.  Plaintiff was in custody and under the control of Defendants’ and each of them during and at all times described of in this Complaint.
            26.  At all times describes in this Complaint, Plaintiff was an unarmed, defenseless male with little or no sexual experience and disabled, such that he was no match for the trained and sophisticated Defendants.
            27.  All of the above-described acts and/or omissions by the Defendants were intentional, knowing, willful, wanton, malicious and/or in reckless in disregard for the Plaintiff’s federally protected rights and welfare, and were done pursuant to the preexisting and ongoing deliberately indifferent official custom, practice, decision, policy, training, and supervision of the Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson, acting under color of state law.
            28.  With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from excessive force, and from slavery or involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime for which they have been duly convicted, Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to a dangerous environment of patient brutality, rape, sexual exploitation, assault, battery, and sexual assault of a disabled person by:
a.              failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the constitutional limitations on the use of force, false imprisonment and unlawful sex with Facility patients;

b.              failing to adequately punish unconstitutional uses of force and unlawful sex with Facility patients;

c.              ordering and tolerating the use of unconstitutional force, false imprisonment and unlawful sex with Facility patients;

d.              failing to properly or neutrally investigate complaints of excessive force, false imprisonment and unlawful sex with Facility patients; and,

e.              ordering, tolerating, encouraging, and permitting collusive statements among the Facility staff and the police in such situations.

            29.  It is the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom, habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson to order and permit staff members to use excessive force, battery and unlawful sexual acts against individuals when such activities and perversion are unnecessary and unjustified. It is also the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom, habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson to fail to supervise and train staff in the appropriate constitutional implications and limits on rape, sexual abuse of the disabled and sexual perversion, despite knowing that these staff are critical to the protection of the constitutional rights of the patients, and therefore may create a significant risk of injury to the public who are patients at the Defendant Facility.
            30.  With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from excessive force, and in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to unconstitutional and abusive uses of force, sexual abuse and deprivations of fundamental humanity under auspices of “mental health treatment” by:
a.              failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the rights of citizens to be free from force and sexual misconduct in mental health facilities;

b.              failing to adequately punish rape and sexual misconduct actions of the Facility staff;

c.          ongoingly ordering and tolerating unlawful rape, sexual misconduct, force, and manipulation-based selective treatment among the staff and in decisions regarding the ongoing incarceration of those found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity; and

d.              failing to properly investigate complaints of unlawful sexual misconduct, rape, and toleration of collusive statements by involved staff in such situations.

            31.  It is the longstanding, widespread, deliberately indifferent custom,
habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson to order and permit staff members to engage in sexual acts with patients and disabled persons, as well as to fail to supervise and to train staff in the constitutional rights of individuals.
            32.  With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens to be free from excessive use of force and sexual abuse, Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson have ongoingly ordered, encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to the excessive force and rape, sexual misconduct and sex with disabled patients, and have covered up reports of incidents by their refusal or failure to investigate complaints regarding staff misconduct.
            33.  It is the longstanding and widespread custom, habit, practice and/or policy of the Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson to find no fault with staff conduct as long as any story is offered by staff, regardless of how incredible.
            34.  Defendants Corcoran and Dawson require senior staff to routinely ratify, acquiesce, rubber stamp, and tolerate malicious collusive conduct and unconstitutional actions of staff by routinely ignoring serious complaints of sexual misconduct and other violent sexual acts against Facility patients, and by encouraging fabrication of evidence by the staff.  Defendants State, Facility, Corcoran and Dawson did precisely that, in this case.
            35.  These final policy decisions by Defendants Corcoran and Dawson in their roles as final delegated policy decision makers with respect to reviewing misconduct created liability for Defendants State and Facility. They are also  further evidence of the ongoing and deliberately indifferent custom, habit, policy, decision, practice, training and supervision of the staff of Defendants State and Facility, wherein the Defendants Corcoran and Dawson order, tolerate and encourage lawlessness and disregard for the federal rights of patients.
            36.  In the period addressed by this Complaint, and before and since the events described herein, Defendants Corcoran and Dawson, without serious investigation, have declared or suggested that other complaints of sexual misconduct involving excessive force and unlawful sex with disabled patients and outrageous actions by staff were unfounded, and they have provided cover-up support to members of the staff who were violating the constitutional and statutory rights of patients.
            37.  As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of each of the Defendants, Plaintiff has been substantially injured.  These injuries include, but are not limited to, loss of constitutional and federal rights, physical injuries, physical and mental impairments, great pain and emotional distress, and/or aggravation of pre-existing conditions, and ongoing special damages for medically/psychologically related treatment necessitated by the unconstitutional and brutal concerted conduct of all the Defendants.
            38.  The Plaintiff now suffers from these injuries, with an inability to consistently live a normal life free from the trauma of rape, sexual manipulation and control by Defendant Lenhardt and by the very staff charged with responsibility for his treatment or rehabilitation.
            39.  The Plaintiff also suffers persisting emotional damage the extent of which has not yet been fully ascertained. Plaintiff continues to suffer ongoing emotional distress, with significant stress related symptoms.
            40.  Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages on all claims against the individual Defendants personally, to redress their willful, malicious, wanton, reckless and fraudulent conduct.

V.       CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

 

FIRST CLAIM:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 -Excessive Force, Unlawful Search, Seizure and False Imprisonment in violation of the Forth and
Fourteenth Amendments (against all Defendants)

            41.  Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth at length herein.
            42.  Relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .


            43.  Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and all of the individual Defendants to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
            44.  All individual Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as staff of the State and/or Defendant Facility and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment.
            45.  At all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Forth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force, assault, battery, sexual misconduct and rape by the staff of the State.
            46.  At all times complained of herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right under the Forth and Fourteenth Amendments to bodily integrity and to be free from unlawful searches, seizures of his property and imprisonment under false allegations, lies or trickery by the staff of the State.
            47.  Any reasonable person knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
            48.  The actions, deception and enslavement as well as the use of force by Defendant Lenhardt, as described herein, were also malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected rights. The force and failure to protect the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the use of unlawful excessive force, assault, battery, sexual misconduct and rape by the Defendant violated the Forth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff. Defendant Lenhardt used deception and other trickery involving the sexual enslavement of the Plaintiff to falsely imprison Plaintiff and prolong his incarceration without justification and only to satisfy her sexual perversion.
            49.  The force used constituted excessive force, assault, battery, sexual misconduct and rape in that it could have caused and did cause serious injury to the Plaintiff.
            50.  None of the Defendants took reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking excessive force, assault, battery, sexual misconduct and rape of Defendant Lenhardt or from the continuing excessive force, assault, battery, sexual misconduct and rape prolonging the Plaintiff’s imprisonment despite being in a position to do so. The Defendants are each therefore liable for the injuries and damages resulting from the objectively unreasonable and conscience shocking force and other constitutional violations caused by each other Defendant.
            51.  Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected constitutional rights.
            52. Defendants engaged in the conduct described by this Complaint with shocking and willful indifference to Plaintiff's rights, in full conscious awareness that they would cause Plaintiff severe physical and emotional injuries.
            53.  The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, in the context and
circumstances where the Plaintiff represented no threat of harm to himself, other patients or staff violates the contemporary standards of decency, and at no time was the Plaintiff’s imprisonment justified by his own conduct, but only due to the misconduct and violations of his rights by the Defendants.
            54.  The Defendants, and each of them, conducted a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm to the Plaintiff by forcing him to submit to excessive force, assault, battery, sexual abuse and rape which constituted an unlawful bodily touching and stripping away his dignity and humanity by submitting to a female staff member under whom the Plaintiff’s freedom and wellbeing were solely and completely under her control.  Such actions violate contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident.  The Defendants used force in a willful, wanton and unnecessary fashion, as there was no need for sex at any time or under any circumstance nor was any force, assault, battery, sexual activity and/or rape appropriate for a trained, responsible staff member in the mental health profession.
            55.  The Defendants’ excessive force, assault, battery, sexual abuse and rape exceeded any reasonable use of force as no force was required whatsoever.  The use of force involving the sexual enslavement of the Plaintiff constitutes force, assault, battery, sexual activity and/or rape, seizure and imprisonment of the Plaintiff where such a use of force is so repugnant as to shock the conscience of mankind.
            56.  The acts or omissions of all individual Defendants were the direct and
proximate causes behind Plaintiff's injuries.
            57.  The individual Defendants acted in concert and joint action with each other.
            58.  The acts or omissions of Defendants as described herein intentionally deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and caused him other damages.
            59.  The individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
            60.  The Defendants to this claim, at all times relevant hereto, were acting pursuant to municipal/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining to Plaintiff.
            61.  As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling him to compensatory and special damages, in amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limit.
            62.  On information and belief, Plaintiff may suffer lost abilities to recover and may further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society through the prolonged false incarceration and other sexual abuses outlined herein.
            63.  Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
            64.  In addition to compensatory, economic and consequential damages, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against each of the individually named Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that the actions of each of these individual Defendants have been taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

SECOND CLAIM:
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Direct Orders and Deliberately Indifferent Policies, Practices, Customs, Training, and Supervision in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments (against all Defendants)

            65.  Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
            66.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

67.   Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and Defendants
to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
68.   The Defendants to this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting
under the color of state law.
69.   Plaintiff had the following clearly established rights at the time of the
complained of conduct:
a.   the right to bodily integrity and to be free from excessive force, unlawful search, seizure and imprisonment by State’s staff under the Forth and Fourteenth Amendments;

b.  the right to due process of law without interference with his liberty interests and constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment;

            70.  Defendants Corcoran, Facility and State knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
            71.  The acts or omissions of these Defendants, as described herein, deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional and statutory rights and caused him other damages.
            72.  Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
            73.  Defendants Corcoran, Facility and Defendant State were, at all times relevant, policymakers for the Defendant Facility, Defendant State and Defendant Facility, and in that capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the same and gave direct orders to violate the Plaintiff’s rights in this case.
            74.  These Defendants ordered and committed the actions, developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, which were direct and proximate causes behind the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional and federal rights as set forth herein and in the other claims, all of which resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various available alternatives.
            75.  Defendants Corcoran, Facility and State have ordered, created and tolerated an atmosphere of lawlessness, and have developed and maintained long-standing, institution-wide customs, punishment and enforcement related policies, procedures, customs, practices, and/or failed to properly train and/or supervise its staff in a manner amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and of the public.
            76.  In light of the duties and responsibilities of those staff that participate in controlling the behavior of recipients of services and preparation of reports on alleged sexual misconduct, the need for specialized training and supervision is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and/or supervision is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional and federal rights such as those described herein that the failure to provide such specialized training and supervision is deliberately indifferent to those rights.
            77.  The unlawful orders and deliberately indifferent training and supervision provided by Defendants State, Facility and Corcoran resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives available to these Defendants and were direct and proximate causes in the constitutional and federal violation injuries complained of by Plaintiff.
            78.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
has suffered actual physical and emotional injuries, continues to suffer present adverse effects and deprivations of his rights, and reasonably fears that he will suffer the same adverse effects in the future, thereby entitling him to injunctive relief and orders of the Court prohibiting contact from the Defendants.
            79.  Plaintiff continues to suffer loss of opportunity and ability to recover and will further suffer physical and emotional pain from ongoing and continued loss of society from the prolonged incarceration and failure to report the misconduct or other false reports used to cover-up Defendants’ use of excessive force and unlawful sexual misconduct. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.
80.   Plaintiff seeks appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to redress Defendants' above described ongoing deliberate indifference in policies, practices, habits, customs, usages, training and supervision with respect to the rights described herein, and with respect to the ongoing policy and/or practice of the State in failing to investigate or appropriately handle complaints of the same, which Defendants have no intention for voluntarily correcting despite obvious need and requests for such correction.

THIRD CLAIM:

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Direct Orders, Deliberate Policies, Practices, Customs, Training , and Supervision effectively establishing a state system of slavery or involuntary servitude unrelated to any punishment for criminal conviction, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment (against Defendant State only)

 

            81.  Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

            82.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

 

            83.  Plaintiff in this action is a citizen of the United States and Defendants
to this claim are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
84.   The Defendants to this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting
under the color of state law.
85.   Plaintiff had the following clearly established rights at the time of the
complained of conduct:

a.  the right to treatment for his mental illness which is adequate and humane, and reasonably calculated to enable improvement of his mental condition so that he will not be a danger to himself or others and can regain his liberty and rejoin the community, or treatment that is reasonably calculated to prevent his further decline;

 

b.  the right to remain free from all purposely inflicted abuse, physical injury, sexual abuse, or mental injury as punishment for any crime of which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity;

 

c.  the right to be released from involuntary psychiatric commitment at a time no later than when he has recovered his sanity and is no longer mentally ill and dangerous.

 

            86.  Defendant State knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.

            87.  The acts or omissions of Defendant State, as described herein, deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional and statutory rights and caused him other damages.

            88.  The Defendant ordered and committed the actions, developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, which were direct and proximate causes behind the violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional, federal and statutory rights as set forth herein and in the other claims, all of which resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various available alternatives.

            89.  Defendant State has never defined, discovered or researched what type of treatment may be adequate, humane, and reasonably calculated to enable improvement of any mental condition so that an individual will not be a danger to himself or others and can rejoin the community, or what type of treatment might prevent anyone’s further deterioration.  Instead, the Defendant has abdicated all responsibility for such judgments or understandings in favor of orthodox medical authority.

            90.  Such medical establishment, talent or authority as the Defendant State has been able to impress or lure into an enterprise of “forensic mental health” was never scientifically competent to provide treatment reasonably calculate to improve or cure mental illness, or to resolve insanity, or to help persons such as the Plaintiff.

            91.  As a direct result of Defendant State’s refusal or neglect of its responsibility, and its abdication as identified herein, institutions such as Defendant Facility have never been honest hospitals employing doctors to help patients; instead they have become plantations employing overseers and perverts to control and exploit disabled people.  Illinois’ forensic mental health system is in fact slavery, in a very literal sense.

            92.  Plaintiff seeks appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to abolish this slavery, pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.

 

 

VI.           PRAYER FOR RELIEF

 

Plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against each of the Defendants and grant:
A.    compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

B.    economic losses on all claims allowed by law;

C.    punitive damages on all claims allowed by law against individual Defendants and in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of the jurisdictional limit;

D.    attorneys' fees and the costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, including expert witness fees, on all claims allowed by law;

E.    pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;

F.     Court ordered equitable and injunctive relief from any contact or communication from the Defendants including further sexual advances, assaults or other seductive sexual communication from the Defendants;

G.    Court ordered declaratory and injunctive relief such as may help to end psychiatric slavery, exploitation, and sexual abuse under the guise of mental health in Illinois; and

H.    any further relief that this court deems just and proper, and any other appropriate relief at law and equity.

 

 

PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.




Respectfully submitted,



   /s/ S. Randolph Kretchmar                        
S. Randolph Kretchmar
One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff

Law Offices of Kretchmar and Cecala, PC.
1170 Michigan Avenue
Wilmette, IL 60091
847-370-5410

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